I. Introduction
Here's a radical idea: let's rationalise the law of tort so that it's intelligible to ordinary people. Doesn't sound very radical, does it? Maybe not, but two recent episodes have made me think it should be a priority in developing tort law in the twenty-first century.
The first was this. In May 2012, anniversary celebrations in Paisley, Scotland, marked the 80th birthday of the House of Lords' decision in Donoghue v Stevenson. 1 I was at that time Director of the Institute for European Tort Law in Vienna and gave a lecture offering some comparative observations on the great case from the standpoint of the codified civil law tradition of continental Europe. My title was: 'Let's codify the neighbour principle.' Though the conference proceedings were subsequently published in a special issue of the Scottish legal periodical, the Juridical Review, 2 you will look in vain there for my own paper. I have to confess that I simply failed to produce a concise, declaratory version of the neighbour principle, or any of the more modern tests for the existence of a duty of care, that made any sense at all while remaining faithful to the existing case law. All the exercise accomplished was to persuade me that the common law's whole approach to the duty of care concept is so completely incoherent 1 [1932] that it precludes any effort to communicate or discuss its nature and role in intelligible terms. I believe that this is emblematic of a wider intelligibility problem in the law of tort.
My other main impulse was a curious feature of some of the legislation that has addressed the English common law of tort in recent years. 3 Successive statutes-and here I particularly have in mind section 1 of the Compensation Act 2006 and the Social Action, Responsibility and Heroism (SARAH) Act of 2015-explicitly purported to do no more than re-state particular aspects of the existing common law because it was felt that public misconceptions about what the law required were having a detrimental effect on how people conducted themselves. 4 The predominant attitude to the reforms of English tort lawyers has been that they are pretty much an irrelevance, 5 but it seems to me that they are more significant than is generally admitted, though probably not in a way intended by their proponents. To me, the main significance of these 'microrestatements' is to highlight the unintelligibility to most ordinary people of even the simplest component parts of our law of tortious liability and our utter failure as tort lawyers to communicate the basics of tort law to the wider community and to engage in public debate about its future. There are doubtless numerous reasons why we have failed so badly, one being a prevalent attitude, at least amongst academic tort lawyers, that what Parliament does is out of our hands, and not our concern, and that our focus should be the 'immanent rationality' 6 of the common law. 7 But the factor I wish to highlight here-arguably, the most important factor-is that the subject matter of tort is simply incoherent on multiple levels. If we, as members of the legal community, are to communicate the content of tort law in terms intelligible to the wider public, to engage in debates about its merits and, where appropriate, to lead the way in shaping its future development, we need first to take steps to rationalise what remains a ramshackle, under-systematised corpus of law. To that end, I here present three, tentative proposals, which I hope will set us in the right direction.
II. Three Proposals to Rationalise the Law of Tort
To anyone who doubts that tort law is an incoherent mess, ask yourself the following elementary questions: How many torts are there? Do we really need so many? Is the real focus of tort law on rights, wrongs, duties or simply compensation for loss? If the answer is 'all of the above', can tort law actually play these different roles concurrently without self-contradiction? Conversely, is it coherent to see tort law as 'just' concerned with rights, or just with duties, and are its duties in fact 'real' duties at all? Some of these questions (e.g., do we need so many torts?) have been almost completely neglected in the tort law literature; others (e.g., what is tort's real focus?) have sparked intensive debate, though opinions on them remain defiantly polarised. 8 It is therefore with a certain trepidation that I venture some simple thoughts as to how they might most convincingly be answered, in setting out a rather personal selection of issues that 6 E Weinrib, 'Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law ' (1988) 97 Yale Law Journal 949 (propounding an account of law as elaborated from within rather than exported from outside by way of the legislative process). I believe need to be addressed if tort law really is to be intelligibly communicated to those subject to its rules: the public generally.
A. Rationalising the Bases of Tortious Liability (Do We Need 70+ Torts?)
As I have noted before, 9 a first step would be to rationalise the number of distinct liabilities we recognise in the law of tort. Bernard Rudden famously listed some seventy different torts that are recognised in one or other common law jurisdictions, but made no pretence of completeness and accepted that some of the liabilities listed could legitimately be broken down into further, more narrowly defined sub-torts. 10 Since he wrote, a number of additional torts might plausibly be added to the list-for example, harassment, 11 interference with reproductive autonomy, 12 infringement of EU competition law 13 and governmental violation of EU law. 14 Is this profusion of causes of action really necessary, or could Occam's razor 15 usefully be applied to some causes of action, which, on closer analysis, turn out to be superfluous?
Our Continental neighbours certainly make do with far fewer tortious liabilities.
France provides perhaps the most extreme-as well as the most celebrated-example, dealing with the substantially the whole of its law of responsabilité extra-contractuelle in just five articles of the Code Civil, beginning with the general liability for fault in art 1382. The following articles clarify the meaning of this general clause (art 1383) and add to it a set of strict liabilities (as they are now seen to be) 16 in respect of persons and things (art 1384), animals (art 1385) and the collapse of a building (art 1386). The German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, BGB) is not so concise: the thirty-one paragraphs it devotes to torts (unerlaubte Handlung) 17 contain three liabilities of general scope, sometimes termed its three 'mini general clauses'. 18 These consist in a general liability for fault, restricted to unlawful violation of specific interests ( § 823 I BGB), a liability for breach of statutory duty ( § 823 II BGB), and a liability for intentional damage contrary to public policy ( § 826 BGB). In addition, there is a miscellaneous set of more specific liabilities, numbering perhaps five in all, depending on how one counts them. 19 That gives us an overall total of eight distinct causes of action-still considerably fewer than the common law's 70+.
This superabundance of liabilities has been a recipe for confusion. There is all too often a lack of any clear rationale for differences between overlapping causes of action, 20 while apparently common concepts are given different meanings even in torts that are closely connected, as recently highlighted with regard to the concept of 'unlawful means' in the economic torts. 21 No distinction in the causes of action is to be left without legal consequence, or so it seems. It has been remarked that the economic torts have 'lacked their Atkin' 22 -adverting to Lord Atkin's leading role in providing the re-conceptualisation of negligence to fit it for purpose in the twentieth century. As the task is not the sole preserve of judges but falls to academics too, one might add that the economic torts-indeed the law of torts as a whole-have also yet to find their Peter Birks. 23 I do not purport in this article to provide a comprehensive revision of the distinct bases of tortious liability, indicating which torts to keep and which to abolish. Before one gets to that stage, one must first identify the criteria to be applied. So I content myself here with merely proposing a simple methodological first step and briefly To begin: one reason for having a set of torts additional to the tort of negligence is to allow for strict liability in those contexts in which such liability is considered desirable. A distinct legal basis must be provided for the liability as, by definition, there is no cause of action in negligence in the absence of (legal) fault. 26 So, even a rationalised law of tort would retain the strict liabilities that are currently recognised, though it would undoubtedly be desirable to develop a more coordinated approach to them and to remove anomalies-in England, strict liability arises mostly under statute 27 and takes a variety of different forms that have mostly escaped scholarly attempts at theorisation, 28 while the common law strict liability rule of Rylands v to the person, allowing compensation for the upset and distress associated with unlawful touchings of the body (battery) 41 and the deprivation of liberty (false imprisonment). 42
The last reason I shall suggest here for providing a separate head of claim for some of the liabilities just mentioned is that they require a specific balancing of countervailing rights and interests which cannot be accomplished so transparently or so effectively through the inquiry into breach of duty in the tort of negligence. Two examples may be given. First, in resolving disputes between neighbouring landowners, it is insufficient to ask whether the one took reasonable care in using the land so as to avoid or reduce the risk of interfering with the other's use and enjoyment of the land affected. 43 Instead, the law of private nuisance highlights a set of specific circumstances that together determine whether the interference is lawful or unlawful, including the degree and duration of the interference, 44 the character of the locality in which it occurs, 45 whether the claimant was unusually sensitive to the interference, 46 and whether the defendant was careless or malicious in causing the interference. 47
Specific rules address such commonly occurring scenarios as where the defendant has planning permission to pursue the activity in question, 48 where the defendant obstructs the claimant's light 49 or ventilation, 50 or removes support to the claimant's land, 51 and where the claimant 'comes to the nuisance'. 52 These rules give the law clarity and predictability in its application to ongoing relationships, which would be impossible to achieve through the vague standard of reasonable care in negligence. Second, the law of defamation must perform the difficult task of balancing rights to reputation with the countervailing public interest in freedom of expression. It does so in particular 53 by recognising a set of defences-absolute privilege, 54 qualified privilege, 55 honest opinion 56 and publication on matter of public interest 57 -that allow persons to speak freely about others in particular contexts and in particular ways without the 'chilling effect' 58 of being judged against the vague standard of reasonable care if they cannot demonstrate the truth of their statements. 59 The same concern to ensure clarity and predictability about the scope for freedom of expression also applies in other torts, as recently underlined in respect of liability under Wilkinson v Downton. 60
On one level, a rationalisation of tort law along the lines suggested would not be radical at all, as one would be left with the familiar structure of liability for negligence, liability for intentional injury and strict liability, 61 supplemented with a miscellaneous set of liabilities arising in specific contexts and/or addressing specific interests.
However, asking the simple question 'what tortious liabilities do we really need beyond negligence?' has radical potential as a first step towards excising those torts that no longer serve a useful purpose and then-as a future second step-the re-categorisation of what remains in simpler, more rational terms.
B. Separating The Functions of Compensating Loss and Protecting Rights
The alert reader may have noted that I did not include the vindication or protection of rights amongst the illustrative reasons I gave for recognising tortious liability outside the tort of negligence. That is because I think that to do so should not be the task of tort law at all-at least, insofar as one is speaking of direct rather than indirect vindication, in the sense I shall specify shortly.
Robert Stevens' now well-known thesis 62 is that, in the common law, the law of tort(s) is best conceived as 'concerned with the secondary obligations generated by the infringement of primary rights', 63 and this conception is fundamentally different from, and preferable to, the rival conception of tort law as concerned primarily with liability for the infliction of loss (which he takes to be probably the dominant conception in the common law today, as well as that embodied in French tort law). 64
In my opinion, it is too crude to characterise entire legal systems exclusively in terms of loss-compensation or rights-protection, and the perceived contrasts often reflect nothing more than differences in the definitions of primary rights or the scope of their protection, rather than an underlying difference in conception. In formal terms, liability under any system of civil justice is a secondary legal relation arising out of the violation of a primary (claim) right 65 -whatever the scope of the primary rights recognised by that system. The primary rights dictate the range of harms ('the damage') for which the secondary obligation to pay damages may arise. But there is no set of primary rightsand no range of compensable harms-for which the basic principle does not hold true.
In formal terms, civil liability is always and necessarily a secondary relation arising out of the violation of a primary right. The rights protected by a general liability clause (such as art 1382 of the French Code Civil) are simply more extensive-the set of bilateral claim right/duty relations is larger-than under the common law of tort, which restricts or even excludes liability for interference with certain protected interests in specific circumstances.
And yet, there is at least one respect in which the common law of tort is wider in scope than the tort law of other legal systems, which is that it serves a variety of purposes ulterior to the compensation of the injured (and wronged) victim-and these include the protection or vindication of rights by mechanisms that one does not find in A right of action is a species of power -of remedial power. It is a capacity to invoke the judgment of a tribunal of authoritative application upon a disputed question about the application of preexisting arrangements and to secure, if the claim proves to be well-founded, an appropriate official remedy.' The authors seem reluctant to accept, however, that this power correlates to a liability, saying : '[a] right of action is … not simply a reflection of somebody else's legal position' (ibid). Yet the quoted passage suggests that there is indeed a corresponding liability here-though Hart and Sacks focus on the liability of the court to be required to grant a remedy, not the liability of the defendant to be required to pay damages. In fact, both jural relations seem to be involved in the concept of a right of action. and convincingly in his monograph, 67 but I differ from him in finding this problematic, rather than something to be encouraged. In the common law, the protection and vindication of primary rights is indeed inextricably bound up with the entitlement to compensation for loss caused by interference with those rights. However, this creates potential anomalies and arbitrariness of outcome, and prevents the law from performing either function (protecting and vindicating rights/compensating for loss) with full effectiveness.
As a preliminary to further analysis, it is important to understand that the protection of rights can be achieved by both direct and indirect mechanisms. were once known as the prerogative writs. 71 I would propose, as a second step towards the rationalisation of the common law of tort, the separating out of the two functions of rights-protection and compensation of loss. Or, to be more specific: to separate the direct protection of rights by way of specific relief from the compensation of loss by way of damages. The latter is tort law; the former is not.
To focus for now just on injunctions: these have traditionally been seen as a remedy for an (actual or threatened) wrong, and their availability has depended upon satisfying the elements of the tort, or whatever other wrong is involved. 72 This has created tension in the law, as protection of the right may demand one rule while imposing on the infringer an obligation to compensate for the loss thereby arising may call for a different rule. The injurer's liability generally requires proof of fault, but why should rights be protected only against culpable interference? Conversely, if the right is protected against non-culpable interference, what is the basis in justice in making the interferer strictly liable for the resulting loss? To avoid being caught on the horns of this dilemma, we need to make the requirements for an injunction less demanding than those for damages-at least if the injunction is negative (i.e. prohibitory) in form, as this only requires the defendant to desist from some specified action, whereas damages place an immediate financial burden on the defendant. 73
We can see the tension between the pulls of rights-protection and compensation for loss in a number of areas of tort law, perhaps especially in relation to interference with land and goods. English law has no vindicatio, no specific mechanism for saying 71 for transferring it to someone else. 89 Justification for the strict liability has also been sought in the need to protect property rights against intentional interference, 90 but this also seems dubious, as the intention goes only to what is done to the goods and not its lawfulness: the defendant is liable even if he reasonably thought that the claimant consented to the interference, or that it belonged to a third party who consented to the interference, or that it was his own property. The purported justifications also ignore the likelihood that the owner of goods will have insurance against loss or theft, and is almost always in a position easily to acquire it, so it would be wasteful to induce those dealing subsequently with the goods to insure separately against liability arising in the absence of their fault. 91 The inefficiency is exacerbated to the extent that the owner, as is very likely the case, is better able to estimate the value of the goods and to tailor the insurance cover accordingly.
As a second illustration, consider the law of trespass to land. A parallel problem arises to that in conversion. The law's over-enthusiastic concern to protect the owner's interest in the land leads to the inappropriate imposition of strict liability. Take these examples. A homeowner is seriously injured when he trips over a package left by a delivery driver on the wrong premises-they were previously occupied by the addressee, whose sign is still hanging outside, but the addressee has moved on. 92
Elsewhere, a farmer hears that the telephone company has dug a hole on his land so as to place a pole there, goes looking for it and falls in, suffering injury as a consequence. 93 Another landowner is killed while climbing a tree at the edge of his property when he comes into contact with electrical power lines intruding into his 89 O W Holmes, The Common Law (first published 1881, New York, Dover Publications, 1991) 94 ('The general principle of our law is that loss from accident must lie where it falls, and this principle is not affected by the fact that a human being is the instrument of misfortune'). In fact, the sheer counter-intuitive quality of the 'control mechanism' thesiswhich will be immediately recognised by anyone who has ever tried to teach tort law to a not unreasonably bewildered class of undergraduates-has led to a resurgence of attempts to demonstrate that the duty of care is indeed a 'real' duty. 107 I sympathise with the attempt, but criticise its execution, and in particular its focus on the question of the existence of a duty of care, which assumes that it refers to a myriad set of specific duties with an on-off, fragmented character. On this alternative view, tortious liability for negligence consists of a network of reciprocal relationships constituted by the duty of care owed by one person to another. There is thus not a single 'duty of care' but rather numerous 'duties of care' (plural) 108 of a relatively high degree of specificity, linking a particular defendant with a particular claimant, each duty corresponding to a specific (Hohfeldian) claim right. 109 In Hohfeld's language, these duties are 'multital': a large number of fundamentally similar duties reside in one person, correlating to the same number of claim rights residing in many others. 110
This approach shares with the 'control mechanism' approach the problematic assumption that there are specific situations in which a duty of care 'comes into existence', and that the duty has an on-off character such that sometimes we owe a duty of care and sometimes we do not. Further, the duty has a fragmented character: it is activity specific in that I owe one duty of care in driving my car, another in operating machinery, another in playing sports, another in preparing home-made jam for sale at a fundraising event, etc; it is loss specific insofar as the existence of a duty of care is to be assessed relative to each type of loss the claimant suffers, so it becomes possible to say that the defendant owed a duty of care as regards the claimant's life and (physical) health but not as regards the claimant's purely economic wellbeing. 4. Duty dependent on court's ex post facto judgment. Further chronological incoherence arises insofar as the existence of a duty is also dependant on the court's ex post facto judgment as to whether it would be fair, just and reasonable to impose a duty of care in the circumstances that occurred. Under the tripartite Caparo approach that English law uses to determine the existence of a duty of care, at least in novel situations, a duty arises only when-in addition to being satisfied as to the reasonable foreseeability of harm and the 'proximity' 119 of the defendant's relationship to the claimant-'the court considers it fair, just and reasonable that the law should impose a duty of a given scope on the one party for the benefit of the other.' 120 The circularity of the formulation is immediately apparent, but what is perhaps more serious is how this leaves defendants utterly helpless to identify the scope of their duty of care (for whose interests must they take care? against which risks?) when contemplating engaging in the activity whose performance injures the claimant.
5. Obscuring the concept of which the bilateral legal relations are postulates. At a more fundamental level, the fragmentation of the concept of the duty of care into sets of bilateral legal relations (claim right/duty, privilege/no right) erases the composite idea of which the legal relations are postulates. This composite idea is more than the sum of its parts, insofar as the latter are identified with the specified relations; it is itself an object of legal analysis, to be understood in terms of its function, value, historical development and relationship with other legal concepts, and considerations of justice generally. 121 By contrast, the bilateral legal relations are purely formal in character and are analytical rather than functional. 122 They have no meaning for ordinary people. It may be objected that this account of the duty of care ignores the distinctions that have emerged in the case law between cases where injury caused by negligence may in principle give rise to liability and those in which it may not. How does one account, for example, for the general exclusionary rule applying to liability in negligence for pure economic loss or psychiatric harm? I believe that the answer lies in the duty's protective scope. 123 Where D's carelessness causes injury to C, the question should not be, 'Did D owe a duty of care?', but 'Did C's injury fall within that duty's protective scope?'
This involves a normative inquiry into the losses caused by D for which he or she can justly be made to compensate. Insofar as the reason for finding a breach of duty is that the risks of D's conduct were so foreseeable that he or she ought to have taken precautions to avoid them, but did not, it is logical (but not essential) to limit D's liability to those persons who were foreseeably affected by the breach of duty and to the types of injury that were also the foreseeable consequences of the breach. 124 It also seems appropriate at this stage to take into account the hierarchy of protected interests, such that interests in the person and in property are presumptively protected so long as they are foreseeably injured, whereas pure economic interests presumptively fall outside the scope of the duty of care's protection (despite the foreseeability that they would be harmed). To that extent, the device of the 'protective scope' performs the function not only of 'factual duty' (the foreseeable claimant rule) but also 'notional' or 'legal' duty, 125 where there must be normative consideration of the claimant's entitlement to compensation for the loss suffered. 126
Thus, for example, in the Spartan Steel case, one should say not that the defendant contractors owed a duty of care as regards the claimant's property damage 123 cf Koziol (n 68) para 7/15 ff (protective purpose of the rule on which liability is based). 126 The idea of protective scope cannot solve the particular problems associated with liability for omissions, though these may be adequate addressed-without inconsistency with the approach I am proposing-by other means. One need only observe that the duty of care is generally limited to affirmative conduct and does not usually entail a duty to undertake positive actions for the benefit of third parties. This seems a simple, intelligible notion that does not involve any distortion of the ordinary concept of duty, though naturally the policy choices that underpin the principle are open to debate and criticism.
but no duty of care as regards its pure loss of profit, but that they owed (one) duty of care whose protective scope encompassed the claimant's property damage but not its pure loss of profit. And, in a psychiatric injury case, one should avoid thinking that the defendant owed (separate) duties of care to the primary victim's relatives who were present at the accident, but no duty of care to relatives who were neither present at the accident nor came upon its immediate aftermath, or to unrelated bystanders; instead, one should say that the relatives present at the accident fell within the duty of care's protective scope, while the other persons specified did not.
This way of avoiding the problems associated with the focus upon the duty of care's existence is not entirely alien to our courts, having been relied upon in a number of recent appellate decisions. 127 But the seeds thereby sown have yet to germinate. It is now time for us to give them some reproductive assistance.
III. In Place of a Conclusion
I end this chapter with a rallying call in place of a conclusion. If we, as tort lawyers, care about the future development of this highly politicised area of private law, then we must engage with the public debates about it. We have to overcome the tendency of those of us in academia to focus on common law to the exclusion of statute. 128 We cannot simply let major reforms slip past us. 129 If we allow fundamental principles to be eroded, 130 the damage may be irreparable. But, just as we must challenge the
